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lers, 1096-1291.5 His book remains to this day a seminal 
study of the history of Barcelona from the 11th to the 13th 
century by virtue of its insightful, penetrating approach, 
the relevance of the themes addressed, and its congruency 
and clarity of exposition.6
The legal system of 13th century Barcelona can be de-
scribed, in essence, as primarily the fruit of the self-inter-
ested desires of its rulers. Bensch studies the origins of 
these rulers, or patricians,7 the role they played in direct-
ing urban expansion, which was of benefit to them, and 
how they consolidated and perpetuated their own social 
group by means of family forms suited to their aspiration 
to assume the social leadership of the city. 
The basic clues for interpreting the entire process of 
formation and evolution of the Barcelona patriciate are to 
be found, of course, in the geographical, political and eco-
nomic setting. 
The origins of Catalan Barcelona date back to 801, 
when the Carolingians conquered what was then a Mus-
lim city. Soon the surrounding area under the city’s direct 
influence began to specialize in producing high-quality 
crops. This ultimately led to its being referred to as the 
horta i vinyet (garden and vineyard) of Barcelona. The rec 
comtal, a channel following the course of the ancient Ro-
man aqueduct from the Besòs river, became the city’s first 
source of water power, while the narrowness of the coastal 
plain forced the townspeople to seek whatever resources 
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“Ubi societas ibi ius”: this aphorism, coined by a distin-
guished Roman jurist, tells us that all societies generate 
their own law. The correlative, however, is also true — 
“ubi ius ibi societas” — and reminds us that wherever we 
find law, it is because a society is in existence.2
In another article3 we undertook a more detailed ana- 
lysis of the legal system in 13th century Barcelona, which 
was made up of customs, privileges and some incipient 
regulations which interacted with the city’s own politi-
cal and administrative institutions. The latter took shape 
between 1249 and 1284 in the wake of a series of royal 
privileges setting up the municipality, or universitat, of 
Barcelona, endowing it with legal personality, and re- 
gulating the constitution and functions of its ruling 
magistrates and its consultative and governmental as-
semblies.4 
However, the full significance of this legal system, 
which was specific to Barcelona, becomes clear only in the 
context of the society that produced it. The summary of-
fered in this article will be based on a succinct overview 
of the valuable contributions made by Professor Stephen 
P. Bensch in his fundamental work Barcelona and its ru- 
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the city lacked and the surrounding area did not provide 
from across the sea. 
From 801 onwards Barcelona was to remain united un-
der a single public jurisdiction and the seats of both the 
civil authority (the count) and the ecclesiastical authority 
(the bishop) were in the heart of the city, the civitas or 
urbs. The count and the bishop each owned two of the 
four gates in the Roman walls still encircling the city, 
which were never split up into private fortresses. Barcelo-
na’s weekly market was held beside one of the count’s two 
castle-gates. This market was a prime source of wealth for 
Barcelona’s foremost rulers. 
Merchants, moneychangers, craftsmen and shopkeep-
ers generally carried on business in the suburbs, the areas 
alongside the walls, and the new towns that sprang up be-
yond the walls between the 11th and 13th centuries. To 
fortify and protect the new districts to the west, James I 
started building a second wall to bring the whole area as 
far as the Rambles into the core of the city.
The interests of the comital dynasty of Barcelona and 
those of the city were not at odds: on the contrary, many 
points of convergence and contact were to arise and these 
afforded joint opportunities that were beneficial to the 
city, to Catalonia, and to the whole new kingdom of 
Aragon, which was formed in the mid-12th century.
The population of Barcelona grew fast: the inhabitants 
numbered 1,500 in the year 1000, about 10,000 in 1200, 
and approximately 34,000 by 1365. The increase created 
supply problems which could only be solved by a policy of 
economic expansion into other parts of Catalonia and 
across the Mediterranean. In this regard the interests of 
the rulers of Barcelona and those of their count-kings 
were clearly in harmony and they acted in coordination. 
Barcelona offered the monarchy a seat of government and 
a source of revenue to finance its policies. In exchange 
Barcelona, by the end of the 13th century, had attained 
predominance over the other cities in the kingdom, 
though it never became the imperial capital.
Bensch also analyses the basic problems that affec- 
ted the organization and coordination of the community: 
the initial constitution of public authority in Barcelona 
(9th-11th centuries);8 the ensuing crisis (11th century);9 
and the rebuilding of public authority, which the counts 
achieved through governmental proceedings (military 
and fiscal measures), by ‘grace and favour’ (granting 
privileges and making appointments to public office), 
and through justice (by validating concòrdies, or private 
settlements, and setting up the tribunal del veguer, the 
vicar’s court). It is important to stress that coopera- 
tion from the rulers of Barcelona had a considerable im-
pact on the political constitution of the Crown of Ara- 
gon,10 Catalonia,11 and the municipality of Barcelona, a 
process which, as mentioned above, was headed by the 
count-king.
The very first privilege granted to Barcelona by the 
Carolingians (801) acknowledged the count’s authority 
over the most serious matters (such as fires, murders and 
kidnappings) but respected local custom12 in other cases. 
The trend was later formally confirmed by an increase in 
the count’s power as military leader and protector of the 
possessions of free peasants. The concentration of gov-
ernmental power in the hands of the Count of Barcelona, 
Girona and Ausona was confirmed by the Carolingians in 
878.
The spiritual power of the Bishop of Barcelona did not 
restrict the temporal power of the Count of Barcelona. 
The bishop’s legal and fiscal immunity did not extend to 
political immunity and the solution was found in an alli-
ance between the count and the bishop in which the 
count’s jurisdictional pre-eminence was clear. Thus the 
bishop never had his own jurisdictional enclave in the city 
of Barcelona.
Even so the counts’ authority was undermined by a 
power crisis in 1041-1059 when the viscounts, veguers 
and castlans (sergeants who administered castles) at-
tempted to seize resources and fiscal rights for themselves. 
Though they were all officials delegated by the count, they 
tended to appropriate their public offices and their rights 
over the administration of justice, the mint, markets and 
utilities (mills, ovens and water).13 In the 11th and 12th 
centuries Ramon Berenguer III and Ramon Berenguer IV 
granted favours and undertook reforms which success-
fully maintained jurisdictional unity in the count’s hands 
and curbed the abuses committed by viscounts and vegu-
ers, which threatened the urban community that was pro-
tected by privileges. 
The veguers of Barcelona (who are mentioned for the 
first time in 1094) and the batlles (bailiffs) of Barcelona 
(mentioned in 1144) were to assist the count in the per-
formance of his public duties, notably in the field of taxes 
and tributes.14
The first census of Barcelona was drawn up in 1145 for 
tax-raising purposes. It is possible to state that the Barce-
lona urban community was identified at this period by 
means of the quèstia, a tax on each family or its assets, 
which had to be paid to the count.
The first instance in which the townspeople cooperated 
in the count’s projects for territorial expansion is found at 
this same period (1148), when eleven eminent citizens of 
Barcelona made him a substantial loan to finance the mil-
itary conquest of Tortosa. Under this agreement for the 
financing of a public war, the burghers who put up the 
loan were to enter the city government and recover their 
capital and interest through the management of certain 
rights, taxes and public utilities which the count assigned 
and ceded to them as a pledge and guarantee of the agreed 
payments. 
Count Ramon Berenguer IV reformed the administra-
tion and in 1179 regular accounting procedures were in-
troduced throughout the king’s domains. This enterpris-
ing conception of government, and the legal security it 
offered, stimulated burghers to invest their capital in the 
royal finances.15 Not only was the royal administration 
gradually becoming better organized and adopting wide 
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pal council), while observing due fidelity and obedience 
to the monarch and his jurisdiction. 
In this way Barcelona’s prohoms (probes homines, or 
worthy men) succeeded in securing the legal institution-
alization of the de facto position of political and social au-
thority which their families had acquired over a long pe-
riod of time as a result of particular set of economic 
circumstances.19
In 985 Barcelona had been destroyed by Al-Mansur and 
its surviving citizens taken captive. This event was fol-
lowed in the 11th century by an initial phase of urban ex-
pansion. Growth was fuelled by a lively land market creat-
ed by the many properties abandoned by their owners and 
demand for land was fairly high because of the accumu-
lated capital that needed to be invested. The market at the 
Old Castle, beside one of the count’s gates in the Roman 
walls, afforded an easy and profitable outlet for the special-
ized crops that grew on the Barcelona plain (horta i vinyet) 
and part of these profits were invested in land.
Moreover, until the Almoravids reached Al-Andalus 
(1090), the disintegration of the caliphate of Cordova 
(1030) permitted the establishment of a tributary economy 
that was beneficial to the counts of Barcelona: the Catalan 
milites (professional warriors) carried out razzias (ràtzies) 
and launched military attacks (empreniments) against the 
Muslim taifas, obliging them to pay tributes in gold (pàries) 
to the Catalan counts in exchange for peace and protec-
tion. This caused a shift in wealth from Al-Andalus to 
Catalonia. However the warriors never joined forces with 
merchants in agricultural produce from the Barcelona 
marketplace to launch more far-reaching projects for ex-
ternal trade. When the Almoravids put an end to the pay-
ment of pàries, the Barcelona economy slumped (1090-
1140). This had adverse effects on the real estate market, 
the volume of credit, liquidity and supplies of coinage.20
It was not the specialized crops of gardens and vine-
yards that gave rise to the second phase of urban expan-
sion (1140-1160) but long-term loans secured on land. 
These loans, which aimed at obtaining income in kind 
through agricultural pledges, were motivated by the fluc-
tuating value of coinage and psychological attachment to 
land as a source of wealth. This was how Barcelona’s first 
patrician families began to accumulate small amounts of 
capital. Thanks to the political action of the counts, these 
families were gradually to fuse into a specific composite 
group. The monarch, exercising his jurisdiction by ‘grace 
and favour’, maintained a balance between the families. 
By so doing he avoided the destructive effects rivalry 
could have had on the community as a whole and on the 
emergence of the new identity which was gradually being 
built up in Barcelona to fill the power void left by the de-
parture of the urban nobility (1040-1140). 
The nobles voluntarily fled the city because they pre-
ferred to consolidate their private power over allodial land 
in the countryside rather than recognizing the count’s 
higher public power in Barcelona and obtaining hypotheti-
cal gains in the city that were subject to that authority.
executive powers, but the economic results achieved and 
the legality of its management were being submitted to 
periodical examination. In other words, the demand for 
accountability introduced the principle of the rule of law 
according to which the management of royal officials in 
Barcelona had to be assessed in the light both of tradition-
al Visigothic law and of the privileges and norms that 
were part of the incipient usages and customs of Barcelo-
na, which would eventually translate the common inter-
ests of the citizens into law.16
The mechanism for solving conflicts and litigation and 
the competence for doing this underwent a similar evolu-
tion in Barcelona and throughout Catalonia. 
Until the 11th century the administration of justice was 
under the exclusive competence of the public authorities 
and the precepts and procedures followed in each case 
were those set out in the book of Visigothic legislation 
(Liber Iudiciorum) and handed down since the 6th centu-
ry. The case was heard by a public court under the chair-
manship of professional judges. The proceedings com-
menced when the defendant was served with a writ and 
concluded when a sentence applying written law to the 
facts rationally proved in the case was published. 
The power crisis that occurred in the 11th century led 
to litigation being solved through pacts and agreements 
between the parties. Thus the sentence — a public legal 
document — was replaced by various private documents 
known as convenientia, concordia, evacuatio, definitio or 
arbitratio.17
When the post of veguer was created in 1094,18 public 
justice was reborn, for the vicar’s court was a public tribu-
nal where suits were settled through the application of le-
gal principles (laws and customs) and not through nego-
tiation between the opposing parties. Nonetheless the 
citizens of Barcelona continued using the latter procedure 
by applying to the Consell de cònsols i homes honorables 
de la ciutat (Council of consuls and honourable men of 
the city — 1094-1140) or the Consell de prohoms or Con-
sell de pròcers (Council of worthy men or of regional no-
tables — 1140-1180). By virtue of their experience and 
knowledge of the traditions and customs of the city, both 
helped to establish precedents and to validate the local 
customs of Barcelona by offering normative criteria and 
assistance in reaching a negotiated settlement in the cases 
submitted to them.
Barcelona evolved from a situation in which two sys-
tems of justice coexisted (the vicar’s public tribunal, or 
Cúria del Veguer, and the Consell dels Prohoms) towards 
the reinforcement of the jurisdiction of the royal veguer. 
Thus citizen justice was weakened and the attempt to in-
stitutionalize the consuls failed (1183-1219).
The reforms introduced between 1249 and 1284 
brought this process to a close. A permanent municipal 
council was set up in Barcelona at this time and the king 
ordered his veguer to take an oath before it, to seek the 
advice of the assembly, and to carry out the decisions of 
the municipality (to endorse the proposals of the munici-
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dodged, however, by redrafting documents in such as way 
that the now illicit practice of usury was concealed be-
neath some licit form of business, which in fact was ficti-
tious, simulated, or indirect. 
The royal finances were one of the chief fields of invest-
ment for the recently accumulated capital of Barcelona’s 
prohoms. In the 12th century the monarchs had raised the 
capital they needed to fund their policy of expansion into 
New Catalonia25 and Occitania from the military orders, 
churches and city financiers. These loans were secured on 
pledges of tributes, tolls and domains in New Catalonia. 
The reign of Peter I (1190-1213) marked the beginning 
of a new era in the field of credit because the vast scale of 
the monarch’s debts forced him to resort to international 
operations and raise collective loans for large sums of 
money. 
It was at this period that Barcelona’s financiers became 
a powerful political force thanks to income from these 
loans: not only were they paid interest but they took part 
in the ventures launched by the king and barons and ac-
quired urban and seigniorial jurisdictions.26
Thus through the peaceable method of granting loans, 
Barcelona’s patriciate became a public, or jurisdictional, 
authority in the city. Guillem Durfort, a prohom of Barce-
lona and financier of Peter I, is a representative example 
of this trend. Durfort formed a society of moneylenders 
which raised large amounts of capital for the king and 
consolidated an emerging group of wealthy Barcelona 
merchants. However, whereas the victory of Las Navas de 
Tolosa in 1212 sparked off speculative enthusiasm, the 
defeat at Muret the following year (1213) triggered a 
large-scale financial crisis, for the monarchy was unable 
to meet its financial commitments to leading Barcelona 
families. 
The royal treasury did not recover from this collapse 
until about 1220.27
However, the patricians of Barcelona had now found a 
method for cooperating with the monarchy and did not 
renounce this method when it came to reinvesting the 
substantial profits they made through foreign trade thanks 
to the imperialistic policies pursued by the Crown of 
Aragon in the Mediterranean in the 13th century.
Thus the expansionist policy of the comital dynasty 
and the commercial policy of Barcelona’s citizens were 
not two separate worlds: they were complementary and 
made Barcelona a part of Mediterranean mercantile cir-
cuits, a development which brought wealth and prosperi-
ty to the city’s merchants.28 A tributary economy fed by 
gains obtained by the force of arms (piracy and demand-
ing tributes) is not incompatible with a market economy 
based on the law of supply and demand and on the price 
differential between the place where a product is bought 
and the place where it is sold. 
The trade protection privileges which Barcelona ob-
tained as a reward for helping the monarchs in their poli-
cies of territorial expansion into New Catalonia and Oc-
citania (12th century) and the Mediterranean (13th-14th 
In the mid-12th century Barcelona’s prohoms did not 
yet constitute a stable, homogeneous group of pre-emi-
nent burghers. As early as 1140, however, a significant 
group of them had begun to assert their leadership in the 
city and to define a set of common economic interests 
which were gradually evolving into usages and customs. 
Soon learned jurists, who had been taught the latest trends 
in Roman and canon law in the universities, were to help 
reinforce these new economic interests by introducing 
and disseminating the European ius commune they had 
studied. The introduction of new legal formulas in such 
fields as family and matrimonial law, real property law 
and commercial law was to afford effective protection to 
the new patricians, their families and assets.21
Later, in 1203, the first privilege granted by King Peter I 
was addressed to the “probis hominibus et habitantis Bar-
chinone”,22 a formula that implied recognition of the pro-
homs as a group of distinguished citizens who exercised 
leadership in the city. 
The explanation for this significant political and social 
rise of Barcelona’s prohoms is to be sought in four main 
factors: (1) the production of artisans and control over it; 
(2) urban loans and their functions; (3) the royal finances 
and urban jurisdiction; and (4) trade and the protection 
of trade.23
The new activities pursued by craftsmen constituted a 
source of wealth which made it possible to attain a modest 
degree of prosperity. However, major property owners 
and investors strove to participate in the profits by rent-
ing workshops and stalls to artisans and offering credit. 
Members of the most important crafts sold their products 
on the local market (hides, iron and foodstuffs) or ren-
dered services (joiners, tailors, innkeepers and butchers). 
Other equally important occupations, however, were as-
sociated with foreign trade (weavers, sailors, merchants 
and money changers) and flourished thanks to certain 
star products such as cloth, spices, silver and skins. 
In the course of their everyday business artisans devel-
oped a collective identity long before most of them formed 
officially recognized guilds (14th century).24
In the 12th century loans secured on pledges and mort-
gages were the two legal formulas that enabled creditors 
to seize encumbered land or receive interest in the form of 
produce from the land. Thus unpaid loans often became a 
much cheaper way of acquiring land than by purchasing 
it. 
Two phenomena which also appeared at the same pe-
riod were the practice of discounting and transferring 
credit instruments and the creation of loan societies 
whose members spread out the profits and obligations 
amongst themselves. 
All these legal tools enabled citizens and prohoms to in-
vest safely and profitably and encouraged their families to 
become dependent on one another. The prohibition of 
usury by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and the lack 
of professional bankers did not stop these privileged — 
and still limited — credit operations. The ban had to be 
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indissoluble, sacramental character, thus lending impetus 
to the nuclear family, defining and prohibiting incest, and 
legitimating paternity and the status of the heir. But the 
change also sought to avoid splitting up the rural proper-
ties of lords, which now provided the bulk of their revenue 
since hosts and cavalcades (armed forays) had ceased to 
be appreciable sources of wealth. 
It is by no means clear, however, that this aristocratic 
family model, which originated in the countryside and 
was a feature of societies elsewhere in Europe, was appro-
priate to the situation of patrician families in Barcelona. 
In Barcelona the reformulation of kinship ties de-
scribed above does not appear to have taken place and 
awareness of a clear distinction between maternal and pa-
ternal relatives, their respective functions and the influ-
ence they exerted on the new nuclear family comprising a 
married couple and their offspring continued to exist. 
Significantly, many early 13th century notarial convey-
ancing documents establish the identity of the parties by 
referring, not only to the father, but to the mother as well. 
The very notion of family, or house, refers at the time to 
an unspecified set of persons, linked by blood, who make 
up a numerous and diffuse group of kin.
As long as the assets of the family, or house, were not 
large, inheritance problems did not arise and the provi-
sions of the Liber Iudiciorum sufficed to determine how 
the possessions of the poor were to be shared out after 
their death. The basic rules of this Visigothic tradition, 
which was still in force in Catalonia in the High Middle 
Ages, stipulated the following: that a very large portion of 
the estate devolved to the descendants; that descendants 
had precedence over ascendants; that all offspring (male 
and female) were entitled to an equal share in the inherit-
ance; and that the father had the right to increase by one-
third the rightful share that devolved to one of his chil-
dren and the right to dispose freely of one-fifth of his 
property (the part de l’ànima, or portion of the soul). 
However, Professor Bensch, who has examined the 
wills made by two hundred and sixty-three lay persons in 
Barcelona between 1100 and 1290, notes significant de-
partures in testamentary practice from the provisions of 
the Liber Iudiciorum. From 1100 to 1140 the strategy fol-
lowed by testators was to keep family property united by 
means of joint, indivisible inheritances.35 Thus the princi-
ple of dividing the estate into equal shares favoured by the 
Liber Iudiciorum was rejected, though the principle of 
equality was maintained when establishing the indivisible 
shares.
Towards 1200, when the monarch was offering the op-
portunity to make profitable investments in royal financ-
es, the patricians of Barcelona tended to concentrate their 
most valuable family assets in the hands of a single heir so 
as to facilitate such investments, which were beneficial to 
the family. 
Joint, indivisible ownership did not disappear, howev-
er, but coexisted alongside the single heir formula. The 
first known testamentary heir was designated in 1227, and 
centuries) show that the spice route and the route of the 
islands (the Balearics, Sicily and Sardinia) fulfilled two 
complementary goals: that of seeking safe routes for trade 
in lucrative products — with Languedoc, Ifriqiya, the 
Maghrib, Romania and Alexandria — and that of main-
taining the inferiority, or subordination, of foreign mili-
tary and commercial competition — from Genoa, Pisa 
and Toulouse — along these same routes.
The overall goal was attained when the gains from for-
eign trade exceeded those generated by plunder and pro-
tection. From this point onwards the monarchs obtained 
much greater resources by indirect means, through the 
promotion of overseas trade, which also contributed to 
the affluence of Barcelona’s patricians. To help achieve 
this they set up an alfòndec (compound for foreign mer-
chants) in the city, staged an annual trade fair in July, and 
granted permits to Barcelona’s main financiers for the 
development of the seafront commercial district of La 
Ribera.29
The most widespread legal formulas for international 
transactions and trade were the canvi marítim (cambium 
maris or sea loan),30 comandes (short-term fiduciary con-
tracts)31 and societats (investment societies in which the 
partners contributed both capital and labour).32 Mediter-
ranean customs and usages were destined to evolve into 
the rules that would facilitate the commercial activities of 
merchants, navigators and seamen. These rules began to 
be written down in Barcelona in the 13th century and the 
process culminated in the 15th century with the publica-
tion of the Llibre del Consolat de Mar.33
The first generations of Barcelona patricians who had 
made their fortunes by investing in crafts, royal finances 
or foreign trade wanted to perpetuate, consolidate and in-
crease their lineage’s prosperity and the position of social 
leadership it had attained during this period (12th-13th 
centuries). To achieve this it was necessary to modify fam-
ily structures and to guarantee specific methods of accu-
mulating and handing down property through marriage 
and kinship.
We will now consider the most significant aspects of 
this process: (1) the background; (2) the notion of kin-
ship; (3) inheritance strategies; and (4) the situation of wi- 
ves and widows with respect to family property.34
For lack of broader perspectives, previous European 
historiography failed to distinguish between urban family 
models in the Middle Ages and those of the rural nobility. 
The traditional view was that kinship structures and do-
mestic institutions were overhauled from the 11th centu-
ry onwards when a family system dominated by cognate 
kinship began to give way to a system of agnatic filiation. 
Under the latter system the line of descent is formed ei-
ther by all the males, who together exploit the inherited 
property (land, offices, castles), or by a single male, or 
heir, who becomes the sole representative of the family 
and lineage in each generation. 
One reason for this change was the Gregorian reform 
launched by the Church, which conferred on marriage an 
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which she renounced. But sometimes the dowry was less 
than the inheritance to which she was entitled, and part or 
all of the amount still had to be paid by her family. 
The previously widespread custom whereby testators 
with children appointed their wives as executors and usu-
fructuaries of their entire estate (senyores i majores) van-
ished from 1250 onwards because once the precise 
amount of the dowry and dower had been defined, it be-
came easy to separate the two and return the correspond-
ing portion to the widow or her family. 
From this time on, owing to the frequent designation 
of a single heir, it was the latter, instead of the widow-usu-
fructuary, who became the head of the family and had the 
moral obligation to perpetuate the patrimony so as to en-
sure the biological continuity of the family and its social 
position in future generations. 
To achieve this, however, if the owner of the estate 
wanted to assure the future actions of new generations, he 
had to take into account and respect the position and 
rights of the women, since only with their contributions 
— both tangible (the dowry) and intangible (family con-
tacts and influences) — was it possible to form a new in-
dependent couple capable of assuming the numerous and 
heavy burdens which were usually their lot.
Barcelona’s patrician families preferred to seek allianc-
es with other families rather than reinforcing direct patri-
lineal descent. Wills, dowries and marriage contracts were 
the legal tools that helped consolidate the patriciate as a 
social group, since they enabled them to perfect the for-
malization of the strategies for the social reproduction of 
their families.38
To conclude this section it remains to examine, as indi-
cated at the beginning, how Barcelona’s patriciate con-
solidated and perpetuated itself in the period from 1220 
to 1300 and to study the family formulas it used to fulfil its 
aspiration to exert social leadership in the city. 
It was during the reign of Peter ‘the Catholic’ (1196-
1213) that municipal councillors began to attend meet-
ings of the Catalan Corts (parliament).
At the parliamentary assembly held in 1228 to prepare 
the conquest of Majorca, it was decided to finance the op-
eration by levying a tax throughout Catalonia. This was to 
be done by putting an old tax known as bovatge — intro-
duced at the earlier assemblees de pau i treva (assemblies 
of peace and truce) to protect the ‘peace of cattle’ — to a 
different use. 
Barcelona was to obtain its share in the division of the 
island as a reward for its contribution. Even more impor-
tant, however, was the fact that the city’s inhabitants were 
to be exempted from commercial tolls on the island and 
from lleudes (taxes on the transportation of merchandise) 
throughout the Kingdom of Aragon. 
The conquest of Majorca was also to make it possible to 
dominate the trade route along the south coast of the 
Mediterranean and this diverted the thrust of maritime 
trade from Barcelona towards the south and east. 
The effect of the creation of Catalonia’s empire was a 
from then on this formula gradually became predomi-
nant. 
It was not a defensive reaction that led the Barcelona 
patricians to adopt the formula of the single heir, as in the 
case of the nobility elsewhere in Europe, for the heir’s pa-
triarchal and financial powers were attenuated by the 
rights of his brothers and sisters to their rightful share in 
the inheritance and by the position of wives and widows 
with regard to the family patrimony.
It is true nonetheless that each child’s legítima, or right-
ful share in the inheritance, was considerably diminished 
by custom until finally the privilege of Recognoverunt 
Proceres (1284)36 defined it as eight-fifteenths, instead of 
fourteen-fifteenths, of the total estate. 
The new conception of marriage as a sacrament intro-
duced by the 11th century Gregorian reform viewed the 
union between husband and wife as part of natural law 
and considered its goal to be the procreation of new 
Christians, who were to save their souls within the Church 
and at the same time, of course, give life to it. 
Thus the nuclear family made up of parents and chil-
dren had to be protected by positive law and above all a 
conjugal fund was needed to assure the family’s earthly 
viability and independence. This meant that from now on 
both partners in the marriage had to be taken into consid-
eration. 
In the 12th century the first steps were taken to assure 
the economic protection of the nuclear family. This was 
done by modifying the provisions of Visigothic law, which 
set the dower, or marital assign, at one-tenth of the 
groom’s assets, an amount that was justified by the former 
brideprice paid by the groom to his future wife’s family. 
In the 12th century the male dower became the espon-
salici, a guarantee or promise of the wife’s future mainte-
nance.
This esponsalici gradually evolved until the wife was 
granted extensive rights over the whole of her husband’s 
property, instead of the husband transferring specific as-
sets to her.
The woman’s contractual power, which entitled her to 
alienate or dispose of the dower or esponsalici, mortis cau-
sa, turned many widows of Barcelona into majores i 
senyores (domina et potens, 1192). This involved a degree 
of joint management of the conjugal fund and therefore 
of the husband’s property.
As early as 1194 we find a contract in which the dowry 
is the bride’s contribution to the conjugal fund. Soon a 
mathematical relationship was defined between the 
bride’s dowry, or aixovar, and the groom’s esponsalici, or 
escreix (the latter term was in use by 1234) and it became 
usual for the ratio to be two to one. Thus the groom’s 
dower was considered to increase the bride’s dowry by 
one-half. It was not long before a single legal document 
was being drawn up to cover the assigns of both groom 
and bride.37
Often the bride’s dowry was deducted from the legítima 
(her rightful share in her father’s and mother’s estates), 
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Around 1250, thanks to the existence of a complex net-
work of routes made secure by the military and diplomat-
ic protection of the kings of Aragon and the commercial 
and logistic assistance offered by the first consulates, Bar-
celona was one of the foremost emporia on the Mediter-
ranean.
Trade was beneficial to many entrepreneurs who were 
not members of the patriciate and to small investors who 
quietly amassed riches over a period of time. It should be 
pointed out, in this respect, that patrician houses adopted 
the strategy of seeking allies among the nouveaux riches, 
rather than excluding them. The latter were often indi-
vidual merchants whose control over Barcelona’s trade 
networks was quite independent of the patrician families. 
Thus everyone in Barcelona — members of the mà ma-
jor, mà mitjana, and mà menor alike — was in favour of 
the development of foreign trade. 
As trade flourished, property values in the city rose and 
demographic growth created keen demand for housing 
and business premises (workshops and stalls). This in 
turn caused the area beyond the walls to be built up and 
gave rise to the emphyteutic letting and sub-letting of 
property.
The hierarchical division of the domain implicit in em-
phyteutic tenure allowed more people to share in the 
profits from realty while making premises available to 
those who needed them to live and work in. 
The legal formula of emphyteusis was already in use in 
Barcelona in 1196 while the lluïsme (see below) existed by 
1210. Let us recall that the dominus (the holder of domin-
ium eminens or “ultimate ownership” of the property) re-
tained the following rights: (1) fadiga (fatica or right of 
first refusal in the thirty days following an alienation); (2) 
dret d’entrada (introitum, the down-payment made by 
the emphiteuticary on acquiring the dominium utile [or 
“useful ownership”] of the property as a result of the divi-
sion or sub-division of the domain); (3) lluïsme (laudesi-
mum, a percentage on the value of the property which was 
charged when the tenant’s rights were transferred to a 
third party); (4) the annual rent, called a cens or pensió.41
The emphyteuticary, or holder of the dominium utile, 
was entitled to the use, enjoyment and possession of the 
house and had the right to sub-let it.
It was not long before the widespread use of emphyteu-
tic tenure gave rise to a chain of holders of the dominium 
utile. This hierarchy of domains soon generated serious 
social tension between those who constituted the first and 
last links in the chain. Ultimately the artisan in his work-
shop and the labourer in his modest dwelling found them-
selves under increasing pressure from the ever growing 
charges they had to bear and could not pass on to anyone 
else. Thus in the last resort profits and income from prop-
erty were derived from trade, but this was also conducive 
to the prosperity of artisans and labourers. 
Whereas in the private sphere emphyteusis was used by 
the patricians to generate valuable income which in the 
last instance arose from trade, in the public sphere insti-
sharp rise in the country’s commercial prosperity. Barce-
lona was the city that benefited most, as can be seen from 
the steady economic growth that marked the entire peri-
od, the increase in population, and the emergence of new 
fortunes. All this gave rise to a new urban social stratifica-
tion which took the form of three socially and economi-
cally differentiated estates, known as the mà major, mà 
mitjana and mà menor (the greater, middle and lesser 
‘hands’).39 They are mentioned for the first time in 1226, 
though the old distinction between prohoms and ciutadans 
(citizens) did not disappear and the prohoms, or pròcers, 
retained the auctoritas they wielded as the social group of 
greatest distinction and repute.
The social tension this growth triggered off was not due 
to friction between the conservative oligarchy (which mo-
nopolized municipal offices, lived from rent on urban 
property, and indulged in property speculation) and the 
enterprising merchants who were taking advantage of the 
growth of trade to become nouveaux riches. 
The struggle between artisans and merchants on the 
one side and the patricians who sat on the municipal 
council on the other was the reflection of rivalry between 
different patrician factions. The patricians, who consti-
tuted a very numerous social group, also took part in busi-
ness ventures. But leadership among them was not easy to 
define and this sparked off internal clashes to determine 
which faction was to assume the social and political lead-
ership of the entire community.40
Contracts for comandes and loans permitted the for-
malization of international commercial operations in 
which capital and labour joined forces to obtain maxi-
mum profits. The credit market gave rise to the concen-
tration of money in banking associations, which paid in-
terest in cash, not in the form of produce of the land. 
Following the prohibition of usury by the Fourth Lateran 
Council (1215), Jews played an important role in this 
field. Christians continued to take part in moneylending 
activities nonetheless, though income from this source 
was not officially revealed. 
Double accounting was already in use in the 13th cen-
tury to conceal — and at the same time to keep track of 
— loans. 
Barcelona’s patrician families took part in trade, first 
with North Africa (the Maghrib) and later with Alexan-
dria and Constantinople. In all these areas consolats (trade 
consulates) were set up to promote and assist in the ex-
porting and importing of merchandise. 
Thus local products were exported from Barcelona 
(fustian and linen cloth, cereals, olive oil, wine, figs and 
leather), as well as goods from Languedoc (woollen cloth) 
and from the local black market (weapons, naval supplies 
and grain). Goods imported to Barcelona included local 
produce from the Maghrib (cumin, goat hides and fruit) 
and the East (ginger, cinnamon, pepper, dyes and alum).
The Barcelona patricians also exported products origi-
nating in Valencia, Granada and the south of Italy (sugar, 
cotton and weapons). 
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Crown’s chief bankers and moneylenders, the citizen of 
Barcelona Arnau ça Bastida, mestre racional to the court 
(chief accountant and auditor). This brought all the offi-
cials of the Crown of Aragon under the financial and ad-
ministrative supervision of the major societies of money-
lenders to the king.46
A clear alliance was forged between the king and the 
patricians of Barcelona. The patricians had confidence in 
the monarch and his policies and invested large sums in 
the royal finances in order to obtain his patronage. How-
ever the maintenance of such a widely scattered empire 
produced considerable fiscal tension. The strain became 
unbearable and the king was ultimately unable to satisfy 
his creditors in Barcelona. This triggered the first serious 
banking crisis (1300).47
This same alliance between the king and the patricians 
of Barcelona also accounts for the upheaval and the seri-
ous social conflicts, including outbreaks of violence, 
which occurred in the second half of the 13th century and 
the way these conflicts were solved. However the unrest 
owed more to rivalry between patrician families, who 
competed to exploit the new resources and gain access to 
the king, than to popular resentment over the lofty posi-
tion occupied by the rulers. 
Thus the struggle for the control of trade and rents be-
tween patricians in the district of La Ribera was probably 
the main reason for the murder of the rogue landlord Ber-
nat Marquet48 and the burning of his houses and property. 
When James I set up the new universitat de la Ribera in 
1258, granted it jurisdiction over taxation, defence and 
urban development, and subsequently approved regula-
tions governing commercial and maritime affairs, he was 
not legitimizing the secession of the merchant class, as 
maintained by Batlle49 and Font,50 but trying to stabilize 
an explosive social situation and to control the district. 
The violent incidents that took place in 1271 were also 
due to problems of kinship, neighbourhood and patron-
age, and not to ideological conflicts or economic inter-
ests. 
The municipal reforms introduced in Barcelona in the 
period from 1249 to 1274 aimed at achieving stability 
among opposing factions of patricians and were not the 
outcome, according to Bensch — who does not share 
Font’s point of view in this respect51 — of the natural, 
peaceable evolution of a privileged class of citizens. 
In 1285, however, Berenguer Oller staged a major re-
volt52 by stirring up the lower orders against the city’s rul-
ers. The king showed his firm support for the patricians 
by crushing the rising and having Berenguer and his clos-
est followers summarily executed. At the same time the 
rioting shed light on the control exercised by certain pa-
trician factions over grain imports and the abusive prac-
tices of major landlords. Both these factors won support 
for the revolt from many different quarters. 
In the mid-13th century the patricians of Barcelona 
sought to perpetuate family identities and estates and to 
consolidate their influence by encouraging matrimonial 
tutional mechanisms and new forms of taxation had to be 
found to raise the large amounts of public money needed 
by the monarchy to carry out its imperialistic policies. 
The predominant legal theory at the time42 was that no 
public duty (munus or commune) could be demanded 
without a just cause. Such causes were clearly defined un-
der theological-juridical doctrine and the monarch’s 
hands were tied with respect to his power to raise taxes, 
which was by no means discretionary.
Thus the king depended more heavily on irregular or 
extraordinary general taxes graciously granted by his sub-
jects than on ordinary taxes and his own patrimonial rev-
enue. 
The municipal regime bestowed on Barcelona under a 
series of royal privileges (1249-1274) arose from the need 
to legitimize the raising of large sums in tax from the city’s 
inhabitants. Paers (paciarii or ‘peace men’) were appoint-
ed in 1249 to serve as both city magistrates and royal fin-
anciers in charge of collecting large sums of money for the 
monarch.43 Thus from the outset the king endowed them 
with powers to levy a comú (comune or tribute)44 from the 
citizens of Barcelona, who were obliged to pay it because, 
formally, it was levied by the city council itself.45 
In 1226, after the citizens of Barcelona had complained 
because the king had demanded a tax ‘without cause’, 
which they considered abusive, James I decided that the 
tax must be levied on the basis of a formal ‘just cause’, in 
other words, that the amount to be paid by each towns-
man must be proportional to his or her assets (per solidum 
et libram). This meant classifying the population accord-
ing to wealth, not social status (mà major, mitjana or 
menor).
Barcelona’s municipal regime was to become a tool for 
dovetailing the energies and resources of citizens, patri-
cians and the monarchy in an era of economic and politi-
cal expansion. The municipality was not a tool for keep-
ing civic factions in check or reducing the de facto control 
of the patricians by setting up representative assemblies. 
The imperialistic projects of the Crown of Aragon in 
the 13th century, led by its monarchs, received staunch 
support from the Barcelona patriciate, who cooperated 
both de facto (from the beginning of the expansion) and 
de iure (from the formal creation of the universitat of Bar-
celona in 1249). However, the intermingling of different 
forms of mutual assistance (commercial, military, admin-
istrative and fiscal) makes it difficult to separate the pub-
lic dimension from the private. 
Barcelona became the centre of naval armaments for 
the Crown of Aragon and the success of the commercial 
and political expansion across the Mediterranean led to 
the formation of a banking consortium through which 
the citizens of Barcelona could invest in foreign trade. 
In 1268 the monarch prohibited the establishment of 
foreign money-changing tables in Barcelona and after the 
conquest of Sicily (1282) he was able to pay his creditors 
with ease by granting them the right to import Sicilian 
wheat. Moreover in 1293 James II appointed one of the 
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unions between their respective houses. Thus by the end 
of the century all Barcelona’s main patrician families were 
linked by an intricate web of kinship and consanguinity; 
all their members were related, in one way or another. 
Each patrician family, moreover, was attached to its 
physical place of residence, or domus, which bestowed a 
common identity on all those who lived there.
Cohabitation forged economic and emotional ties with 
the house and the moral duty to strive to preserve its unity. 
In the 12th century this duty was shared by all male kin, 
who cooperated to promote the family’s well-being, pre-
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